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It’s March 10, 2010 and John Doe is returning home to New York from a business 
trip in Mumbai. He has a minor cough, but feels just fine despite the fact that he is 
incubating the first pandemic horror of the 21st century. He’s already contagious, and the 
virus is airborne. By the time the Airbus A380 lands, a sizable portion of the 555 
passengers have been exposed.1 Half of the passengers stay in New York, while the other 
half make their connecting flights to Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Dallas, and 
elsewhere. It takes another 3-4 days before John realizes that he isn’t battling a run of the 
mill flu. By the time he gets to the emergency room, he is running a fever of 106. John 
dies shortly thereafter. The doctors, learning that John recently made a trip to Africa, 
know to contact public health officials. Two days later, as the virus is discovered to be 
something novel, emergency procedures go into action to contact all those who were 
potentially exposed. Passengers of John’s flight begin to pour into emergency rooms 
across the country. Two weeks after the flight landed, most of those exposed to the virus 
on the plane are dead. The virus has continued to spread despite the efforts of the Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC) and states’ Departments of Health to quarantine and isolate 
those who were potentially exposed.  
Researchers discover that Jane, the person sitting immediately next to John on the 
plane, never developed symptoms. However, her blood tests indicate that she was 
definitely exposed. After several more horrendous weeks, it becomes apparent that a 
small group of people, perhaps 1 in 10 million, has a natural immunity to the devastating 
pandemic. These people have no trace of the virus in their systems. The virus poses no 
threat to them, and they pose no threat to anybody else. Public health authorities 
1 http://www.airbus.com/en (Last visited 4/27/06) 
3desperately need access to their bodies to run a series of potentially painful or deadly 
trials which together have a small probability of producing an effective treatment against 
the virus. However, this small group of genetically gifted individuals expressly refuses to 
participate in any research whatsoever. This paper will examine the ethical frameworks 
for dealing with just such a doomsday scenario.2
The above scenario is one not contemplated by our current public health 
institutions. At first blush it may seem as though the law has already dealt with the 
doomsday hypothetical (hereinafter doomsday). For example, the law grants the state 
governments wide latitude in dealing with public health emergencies under the 10th
amendment to the Constitution, which grants the states police powers.3 However, there 
are two key differences between doomsday and all previous exercises of the police 
power. First, in all previous scenarios, the exercise of authority over an individual has 
conferred a benefit on the individual. However, in doomsday Jane and her cohort have 
nothing to fear from the virus, and would receive no direct benefit from the research.4
Second, in all previous scenarios, government exercise of authority over an individual has 
been premised on protecting society from that individual.5 Here, Jane and the others do 
not carry the virus and pose no direct threat to society. These differences have profound 
ethical implications which have not been dealt with before. Not only have we never 
2 This paper is constructed around the ethical dilemmas inherent in a frightening hypothetical scenario. The 
epidemiological ins and outs of the above hypothetical are outside the scope of the paper. 
3 Annas, George J. “Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties,” New England Journal of Medicine. 
vol. 346:1337-1342, April 25, 2002 num. 17. 
4 The contemplated virus is not one which would so devastate the world population that Jane’s life would 
be substantially put at risk by the deterioration of society. Therefore, Jane’s most rational self-interested 
outcome is to not participate in the research. 
5 Gostin, Lawrence O. “When Terrorism Threatens Health: How far are limitations on personal and 
economic liberties justified?” 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1105, 1148 (Dec. 2003) 
4answered the question of whether or not a person in Jane’s condition may be compelled, 
but it is a question that must be addressed before we are confronted with it in real life.  
The goal of this paper is to encourage prior debate about what limits the 
government should be subjected to when doomsday is fast approaching. The question of 
whether or not the government should be able to force an individual to submit to 
potentially harmful research in an emergency situation where there is no possibility of 
benefiting the individual, and where the individual is not a threat to anyone is one which 
must not be addressed in the heat of a raging pandemic. Ethical choices must not be made 
based on emotionally charged rhetoric, but should rather be made with appeals to cool 
reason.6 There are 3 other reasons we should address the question prior to having it thrust 
upon us.  
First, if we as a democratic society make the decision to strip the genetically gifted 
people in the doomsday scenario of their rights to bodily integrity and autonomy as a 
hypothetical, then Jane herself will have in some way taken part in the debate. In this 
way, we perhaps avoid the charges of exploitation that we would otherwise be subject to 
if we decide to use Jane’s body for the furtherance of society.7 The more fair and open 
the debate, the less exploitative any decisions arising out of that debate could be 
considered because everyone will have had an opportunity to be heard.  
Second, the death toll from a new pandemic or from a bioterrorism attack could 
easily stretch into the seven figures.8 This vast potential harm requires a rapid response 
6 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) 
7 Young, Iris Marion. “Five Faces of Oppression” Justice and the Politics of Difference; Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ (1990). 
8 Kellman, Barry. “Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe.” 24 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 417 (2001).  
5capability. If we are confronted with tough ethical and legal questions in the midst of a 
doomsday scenario, our response could very easily be bogged down by a series of court 
injunctions and confused legislative actions. Thus a lack of legal and ethical preparedness 
will compound the effects of a naturally occurring pandemic or bioterrorist attack.  
Third, if the doomsday scenario is brought to life as an act of terrorism, we must be 
especially vigilant in protecting against the perception of extra-constitutional government 
action. One of the goals of terrorism is to use fear to force democratic societies to 
undermine their own legitimacy.9 In the heat of a bio-terrorism event, if we were to allow 
Jane and her cohort to be limitlessly used by the government we would open ourselves to 
much criticism, and would undermine the legitimacy of our own systems. Rather, by 
debating the appropriate steps prior to the doomsday scenario, we can democratically 
create emergency mechanisms that while potentially quite harsh have been reconciled 
with our constitution and with our consciences.            
American culture - social, economic, and legal - has always been founded on 
notions of individual liberty. It’s not surprising that this is so because the founding 
fathers themselves were highly influenced by the liberal thinkers of their day. The 
constitution they drafted and the institutions that they created were infused with this 
liberal ideology. The Declaration of Independence grounded the philosophical 
justification for breaking away from England in the social contract theory.10 It declared 
that, “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive 
of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
9 Id.
10 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) pg 129 
6Government. . ..”11 Thomas Jefferson did not limit the underpinnings of the Declaration 
of Independence to social contract theory, but also appealed to the more austere 
deontological theories of Kant. The Declaration of Independence famously states that, 
“all men are created equal” and that all men are endowed with “unalienable rights.”12
Despite the strong respect of individual liberties, the founding fathers were also 
influenced by notions of Utilitarianism, and perhaps even by a small degree of 
Communitarianism. In part one of this paper, the ethical theories of John Locke, John 
Rawls, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mills, and various communitarians will be 
considered. Each of these ethical frameworks would approach the doomsday hypothetical 
differently. An analysis of these differences will give us the tools necessary for crafting a 
rational ethical approach to the doomsday scenario. In part two of this paper, the limited 
legal precedent for government compulsion in the public health context will be 
considered. This precedent is important as it provides the starting point from which the 
ethical approaches in part one will need to begin. In part three of this paper, analogous 
situations in which the government either is or is not allowed to interfere with individual 
liberty will be examined. The differences between these analogous scenarios and the 
possible rationale for those differences will shed light on which of the ethical frameworks 
is most likely to be used in constructing an alternative response to emergency public 
health concerns. 
Part I  
Ethical Frameworks 
11 http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/declaration (last visited 4/27/06)
12 Id.
7A. John Locke 
The founding fathers were probably most influenced by the liberal social contract 
theoreticians. Lawrence Gostin has observed that, “Liberalism has become the de facto 
political philosophy in late twentieth and early twenty-first century America.”13
Therefore that is where our analysis will begin.  
Social contract theory is based on two major premises. The first premise is that all 
people possess certain “natural rights.”14 These rights include the right to liberty or 
autonomy, the right to property, and the right to the pursuit of happiness. Essentially, 
liberal theoreticians argue that natural rights are rights of negative liberty.15 This means 
that all people have a right to be free of coercion. The second premise is that in the state 
of nature, meaning the natural condition of humans without governance, men and women 
will compete and fight over scarce resources thereby constantly invading upon one 
another’s natural rights. This premise was developed by Thomas Hobbes who famously 
declared that in the state of nature the life of man is, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.”16
The reconciling of these two conflicting premises is the goal of Social Contract 
theory. Because humans are rational and will realize the inherent conflict in the state of 
13 Gostin, Lawrence O. “When Terrorism Threatens Health: How far are limitations on personal and 
economic liberties justified?” 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1105, 1141 (Dec. 2003) 
14 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) Chp 11 
15 Murphy, Liam. “Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue.” 89 Geo. L.J. 605, 637 
(Mar. 2001). 
16 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) pg 125 
8nature, people will naturally come together and contract to achieve a solution.17 In this 
social contract, Locke argues that people agree not to interfere and coerce other people so 
long as other people agree not to coerce in turn. Because all contracts need an 
enforcement mechanism, government is created to ensure that no person unjustifiably 
coerces another.18 This scenario, however, creates the inevitable situation in which a 
government has been empowered to coerce its citizens. Locke dealt with this problem by 
declaring that if a government breaches its part of the social contract, by either not 
providing protection from coercion, or by itself impeding the liberty of its subjects, then 
the subjects had a right and a duty to rise up and over-throw the government. This last 
part of Locke’s argument is what the colonists seized upon in the Declaration of 
Independence.  
On the surface, Social Contract theory doesn’t leave much room for public health 
law and the attendant invasions of personal liberty inherent in that law. Disease is hardly 
coercion from which the government is bound to protect citizens. How then could public 
health intervention which substantially impedes a liberty interest be justified? There are 
two possible answers provided under traditional Social Contract theory.  
First, when Locke spoke of a Social Contract he of course wasn’t envisioning a 
constitution that every citizen read upon the age of majority and then signed onto. Rather, 
he saw it is an imaginary pact between citizen and government in which a citizen’s 
acceptance of the benefits of that pact equaled tacit agreement to its terms.19 A defender 
17 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) Chp 11 
18 Murphy, Liam. “Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue.” 89 Geo. L.J. 605, 637 
(Mar. 2001). 
19 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) pg 130 
9of public health intervention would argue that interventions such as vaccinations, 
quarantine, and mandatory screening confer a benefit on the individual. The benefit of 
vaccinations, for instance, is that if my neighbor has been vaccinated, he is far less likely 
to spread illness to me. Therefore, the acceptance by the individual of the benefit is 
acquiescence to the term that the individual will submit to the intervention if it is 
required. This rationale is only partially applicable to the doomsday scenario. Jane would 
receive no direct benefit in exchange for her freedom. Thus, how can she be said to have 
tacitly agreed to a term requiring her to surrender her freedom. This essentially amounts 
to a “no consideration” argument in contracts. While it is true that in the specific 
doomsday scenario Jane will not have agreed to give up her freedom if, before the 
doomsday scenario occurred, the legislature had debated and agreed to allow the 
infringement of a citizen’s rights in the doomsday scenario, then Jane can be said to have 
benefited from that policy. Jane will have benefited from the policy because she would 
have gained the security of knowing that if the doomsday scenario occurred and Thomas 
had been the genetically gifted party, Jane would have received the benefit of Thomas’s 
acquiescence to research. Jane’s benefit is essentially an insurance policy that she may 
never need to collect. 
Second, the Social Contract should be looked at more broadly than as just a 
contract between a single citizen and an amorphous government. Instead, the agreement 
is between each and every citizen. As the Supreme Court once opined a “fundamental 
principle of the social compact [is] that the whole people covenants with each citizen, and 
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the 
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‘common good’.”20 Thus, looked at more generically, Jane could be said to have agreed 
to reasonable coercion by the government if it is motivated by an interest in the common 
good.21 This reading of the social contract begs the question of whether or not it is 
reasonable for the government to inflict harm on one of its citizens when that citizen has 
no chance of personally benefiting from the harm. The reasonability of the government’s 
coercion must be made on a case by case basis. 
Traditional social contract theory provides two rationales which could potentially 
justify a substantial invasion of Jane and her cohort’s right to autonomy, and right to 
bodily integrity. The next theory we will examine is a modification of social contract 
theory proposed by John Rawls, which was aimed at reducing the injustices of traditional 
social contract theory. 
B. John Rawls 
Rawls’ addition to the social contract is to argue that nobody deserves the 
handicaps or advantages that they are born into.22 These extraneous factors such as 
familial wealth, race, and nationality, are responsible for many of the inequities in today’s 
society. Rawls posits that an ethical society would be one in which the terms of the social 
contract were agreed upon by the contracting parties without the contractors having any 
knowledge of who they are in the real world. These decisions made from “behind the veil 
of ignorance” would be more equitable, because as rational actors, the contracting parties 
20 Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1904). 
21 Id at 29. 
22 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) pg 131 
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would realize that they are more likely to be disadvantaged than to be advantaged by 
severe inequality.23 Additionally, as the decisions made from behind the veil are 
theoretically freely negotiated, none of the permitted impositions on the rights of 
individuals violate liberal ideals.   
Rawls’ theory of justice provides a useful tool with which to analyze novel ethical 
problems. How would our democratic society respond to the doomsday scenario if we 
were all operating from behind the veil of ignorance? If decisions were made from behind 
the veil, none of the contracting parties would know for sure if they were Jane, or if they 
were someone whose life depended on an unlikely successful drug developed at the 
expense of Jane’s freedom or life. The contracting parties as rational actors would know 
that their chance of being in Jane’s cohort is relatively small when compared to their 
chance of being afflicted by the virus. Moreover, rational parties would recognize that not 
only their own well being, but the well being of their families and of society itself is at 
stake in the doomsday scenario. This realization, however, would not induce a rational 
actor to permit terrible atrocities against Jane or any numerical minority. The rational 
actors must still consider the small chance that they or someone they care about is a part 
of the cohort. Furthermore, the rational party will realize that unrestrained barbarism, if 
committed for little or no purpose, will have far reaching negative impacts on the social 
fabric, quite apart from the pandemic itself. Thus, we can assume that rational actors 
operating from behind the veil of ignorance would permit some amount of invasion of the 
bodily integrity of Jane and her cohort, but that this permission would be tempered by 
23 Parmet, Wendy. “Liberalism Communitarianism, and the Public Health: Comments on Lawrence 
Gostin’s Lecture” 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1221, 1229 (Dec. 2003) 
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some type of oversight requiring that the invasion be as minimal as possible, and that it 
be done in a reasonable fashion.  
The exact form of the restrictions placed on government by a Rawlsian framework 
would vary, but they would try to strike a balance between the welfare of all of the 
individuals in the society, and the rights of Jane and her cohort to bodily integrity and 
personal freedom to be infringed. The next ethical framework we will look at was 
proposed by Immanuel Kant. 
C. Immanuel Kant  
Kant believed that reason could be used to develop a small set of universal ethical 
rules which must be respected at all times by all people.24 Further, Kant argued that the 
morality of any particular act could not be derived from the overall consequences of that 
act, but must be derived from the intention behind the act itself. Id. Kant formulated two 
categorical imperatives which he argued must be complied with at all times. The first 
categorical imperative states that one should “act in such a way that [one] treats 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always . . . as an end 
and never as a means.”25 The second formulation of the categorical imperative states that 
one “should never act except in such a way that [one] can also will that [one’s] maxim 
should become a universal law.”26 Each of these imperatives has important implications. 
24 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) Chp 12 
25 Beschle, Donald. “Kant’s Categorical Imperative: An Unspoken Factor In Constitutional Right’s 
Balancing.” 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 949, 965 (May 2004). 
26 Id.
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The ends/means imperative was derived from Kant’s understanding that humans 
were unique in that they have an autonomous will, and that they possess the ability to 
legislate moral law.27 Because this autonomy is what sets people apart from mere things, 
Kant argued that we must not take that autonomy away from others. In restricting the 
autonomy of others in any way, we begin to treat them like things, which is a moral 
evil.28 Kant did not argue that we could never use people, only that we must not use them 
purely as a means. This imperative has led Kantians to demand a strong sphere of 
protected personal autonomy.29 Kantians have even gone so far as to argue that “coercion 
is virtually never appropriate to achieve public health goals [, and that] . . . individuals 
have fundamental rights to refuse physical interventions. . ..”30
Kant’s second formulation of the imperative is similar to the golden rule. He posits 
that whenever one wills to act in a certain way, that person must consider the 
consequences if everyone acted in that way. Furthermore, Kant argued that if one acts in 
a certain way, one must be willing to accept that others will act that way towards the 
initial actor, and the actor will be considered to have tacitly consented to that behavior. 
Kant derives this formulation by saying that if we are to grant respect to each person’s 
autonomous will, we must be willing to treat that person as they treat others since that is 
the best evidence of how they morally view the world.31 This formulation is used by 
Kantians to justify the death penalty because if a person chooses to murder another, that 
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Gostin, Lawrence O. “When Terrorism Threatens Health: How far are limitations on personal and 
economic liberties justified?” 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1105, 1142 (Dec. 2003) 
30 Id at 1144. 
31 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) pg 143-144. 
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person has chosen to inhabit a moral realm where murder is acceptable. Thus, it is 
society’s duty to respect the murderer’s will by executing him.32
Using Kant’s end/means formulation of the categorical imperative, how should 
society respond to the doomsday scenario? If Jane and her cohort have expressly refused 
to participate with researchers, then coercing them under the first imperative would 
appear to be using them purely as a means to an end which is not their own. Some 
scholars have argued that in the research context, one can never use a subject unless the 
subject has consented and has accepted the ends of the researcher as their own ends.33
Any other use turns an individual into a mere object, and denies her right to autonomy. 
Because Kant claims that an individual’s right to autonomy should be respected even if 
that individual’s behavior hurts herself or another in the process, it appears that even in 
the doomsday scenario Kant would not approve of the use of Jane and her cohort.34
Despite the result achieved by using Kant’s ends/means formulation of the 
categorical imperative, his golden rule formulation might be used to reach a different 
conclusion. The will of Jane and her cohort to not help is an extreme form of selfishness 
which would border on the malicious. In the doomsday scenario, Jane and her cohort are 
electing to stand from the sidelines and watch as society potentially collapses around 
them. This decision to stand on the sidelines is an implicit devaluation of all of the 
individuals condemned to die. Thus, government coercion of Jane and her cohort before 
they refuse to consent to participate in research would be ethically wrong both because of 
the ends/means formulation of the categorical imperative and because society ought not 
32 Id.
33 Hans Jonas 
34 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) pg 143. 
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to coerce individuals under the second formulation of the categorical imperative lest 
society be coerced. Contrastingly, after Jane and her cohort refuse to participate in the 
research, their will is an implicit devaluation of the autonomy of individuals opening 
themselves up to similar devaluation and forced participation in the public health 
research. 
Upon initial consideration, the above reasoning which justifies the coerced 
participation of Jane may appear to be circular, but the key distinction is in the 
chronology. In first allowing Jane and her cohort an opportunity to voluntarily participate 
in the research, we are respecting their ability to act autonomously. If we instead used 
force immediately, we would be using Jane and the others purely as a means to an ends, 
as a mere object. However, after Jane and her cohort have made the selfish choice not to 
participate, forced participation in the research is merely respecting the root selfish will 
motivating Jane’s decision. 
The previous ethical frameworks all evaluated the morality of actions based on the 
intrinsic nature of the actions, without regard to the consequences of those actions. The 
next framework, championed by John Stuart Mill, focuses much more heavily on the 
consequences.                
D. John Stuart Mill 
Mill was a proponent of Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the belief that decisions 
regarding moral rightness or wrongness can be reduced to a determination of which acts 
16
will produce the most human happiness for the greatest number of people.35 For Mill, the 
maximization of human happiness is the only valid goal of a just government.36 While 
Mill subscribed to Utilitarianism, his framework was made more complex by his belief 
that individual autonomy was the key to maximizing human happiness. Mill did not 
believe that utility could be maximized by a long list of heavy handed government 
regulations, rather individuals as autonomous, rational beings were the best suited to 
determine their own utility-maximizing behavior.37 As Mill stated “[h]e who lets the 
world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other 
faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.”38 Mill’s support for individual autonomy was 
not limitless. Mill broke behaviors down into 2 categories, self-regarding behaviors and 
other-regarding behaviors.39
Self-regarding behaviors are those things an individual does which concern only 
her own well being. Because Mill was a staunch supporter of individual autonomy as a 
means to maximizing human happiness, he believed that self-regarding behaviors should 
be completely off limits to governmental regulation. Regulation of self-regarding 
behavior, according to Mill, amounts either to paternalism or moral legislation, both of 
which fail to maximize human happiness. If something is truly self-regarding (almost 
nothing is totally self-regarding) then even if it is objectively unwise for the individual to 
undertake the act, if the individual is rational, she will only take the act if for her it 
35 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) Chp. 13 
36 http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/ (Last visited 3/30/06) 
37 Murphy, Liam. “Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue.” 89 Geo. L.J. 605, 631 
(Mar. 2001). 
38 Id.
39 Gostin, Lawrence O. “When Terrorism Threatens Health: How far are limitations on personal and 
economic liberties justified?” 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1105, 1146 (Dec. 2003) 
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maximizes happiness.  Thus, Millians reject seat belt laws, motorcycle helmet laws, anti-
smoking laws, and similar restrictions on individual choice.40
Other-regarding behaviors are those things an individual does which directly 
impact others. Opining on this category of behaviors, Mill professed his widely known 
harm principle, “The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, both the physical and moral, is not sufficient warrant.”41 Thus, other-regarding 
behaviors like theft or murder can be constrained by the government because they harm 
another. Other-regarding behaviors, in harming another individual, interfere with that 
individual’s ability to maximize her own utility. The harm principle then is not an 
exception to Mill’s utilitarianism, it is just a clarification. 
In analyzing how a Millian would approach the doomsday scenario, the question 
that must first be answered is whether Jane’s behavior is self-regarding. If Jane’s 
behavior is self-regarding, then Mill would argue that the government ought not to coerce 
her. The choice not to participate in the research seems self-regarding. The choice not to 
participate is rarely thought of as an affirmative choice to interfere with others. However, 
in this instance, Jane’s choice is more like opting out of a necessary regulatory regime. It 
is as though Jane decided not to pay her taxes. Jane’s decision not to pay taxes while not 
actively harmful, has a negative impact on every single person in her community both in 
terms of a greater financial burden and in terms of encouraging others to free ride.
If Jane’s decision is classified as other-regarding, the next step is to apply Mill’s 
harm principle. The harm principle allows the government to coerce an individual if 
40 Id. 
41 Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
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doing so would prevent harm to others. Importantly, it does not limit government 
coercion to preventing an individual from personally harming others.42 Consequently, 
despite the fact that Jane herself is not the cause of the harm, Mill would allow her to be 
coerced in order to prevent harm to others. Once it is determined that Jane can be 
coerced, a simple calculation taking into consideration that “health is necessary for much 
of the joy, creativity, and productivity that each person derives from life,” and that a 
much greater number of people could be helped than would be hurt, should conclude that 
coercion of Jane and her cohort would be the happiness maximizing option.  
F. Communitarians 
Communitarians reject the liberal belief that individuals possess rights which 
necessarily supersede the rights of the community as a whole. Rather, they argue that 
communities ought to be the primary point of reference we use when developing a moral 
framework. To support their premise that society is the a priori moral actor, 
communitarians make a couple of different arguments.43 First, they argue that humans are 
intrinsically social animals. Humans lack all concept of the self if community is taken 
away.44 Community, for instance, provides us with language, values, meaning, and 
relationships.45 We cannot reproduce the species alone, and we can’t be maximally 
productive alone. We depend on long-term cooperative communal arrangements.46
42 Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 1989) pg 13. 
43 Ingram, David B.; Parks, Jennifer A. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding Ethics; Alpha Books, 
Indianapolis, IN (2002) pg 264. 
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 265. 
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Second, Communitarians argue that individual freedom is only meaningful if it is 
enforced by some community mechanism.47 Without social enforcement and respect of 
individual liberties, individual liberties would be meaningless.48 Therefore, 
communitarians argue that communities are the primary rights holders.  
As primary rights holders, communities ought to establish ethical frameworks 
which support the well being of the community as a whole. In the public health context, 
Lawrence Gostin argues that: “Without minimal levels of health, populations cannot fully 
engage in the social, economic, and political interactions necessary for community 
survival. Health is foundational for engaging in many aspects of public life . . . Public 
health, then, becomes a transcendent value because a basic level of human functioning is 
a prerequisite for engaging in activities that are critical to communities.”49
Communitarians in the doomsday scenario would almost certainly allow for the 
coercion of Jane and her cohort. Communitarians, as primarily concerned with the well 
being of the whole community, would be willing to subject some individuals to coercive 
research, if that community decided that the harm caused by the coercion to the 
community would be outweighed by the benefits of the research. A recent analysis of the 
SARS epidemic suggests that heavy handed public health measures in China drove some 
of the ill into hiding instead of into the arms of the medical profession.50 This effect 
potentially accounts for some of the greater virulence of SARS in China as opposed to 
Canada where public health measures were much more voluntary.51 Essentially, in the 
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Gostin, Lawrence O. “When Terrorism Threatens Health: How far are limitations on personal and 
economic liberties justified?” 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1105, 1157 (Dec. 2003) 
50 Ries, Nola M. “Public Health Law and Ethics: Lessons from SARS and Quarantine.” Health Law Review 
vol. 12 num. 1 (2005). 
51 Id.
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communitarian framework, the question asked is what is the best solution for the 
community in a holistic sense. In the doomsday scenario where the very life of the 
community is threatened, the answer would likely be that the forced participation of Jane 
and her cohort in research is what is best for the community. 
Having examined the various ethical frameworks for dealing with the doomsday 
scenario this paper will now look at how the law has dealt with coercion in the public 
health context in the past, and at how it would likely deal with the doomsday scenario if it 
were to occur today. 
Part II 
 Legal Frameworks 
A. Public Health Powers 
This section will briefly summarize from whence the government derives it public 
health powers. When the colonies gave up their independence to the Federal Government, 
they retained their police power in the 10th Amendment to the Constitution.52 This power 
reserved to the states the authority to protect the public’s health and safety.53
Consequently, most public health law is state law. While most public health decisions are 
handled as a matter of state law, the police power of states obviously is still limited by the 
Constitution. Moreover, the Federal government has several methods for intervening in 
52 Sapsin, Jason W. “Public Health Legal Preparedness Briefing Memorandum #4: Overview of Federal and 
State Quarantine Authority.” Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and John’s Hopkins 
Universities. Pg 2 
53 Annas, George J. “Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties,” New England Journal of Medicine. 
vol. 346:1337, April 25, 2002 num. 17. 
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the public health. First, the government, via the commerce clause, is permitted to regulate 
those things which may have an impact on interstate commerce.54 Thus, the director of 
the CDC can take reasonable measures to stop the spread of disease if the director 
determines that local efforts are insufficient to halt the spread.55 Second, the Federal 
government has the authority to control the movement of people in and out of the country 
to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.56 Lastly, because the Federal government 
has a duty to see to the national defense, if an act of bioterrorism is suspected, the Federal 
government has the authority to conduct public health interventions.57 In the next section 
we will look at how public health provisions have been applied to quarantines, forced 
inoculations, and compelling one individual to help another. 
B. Public Health Cases 
Coercive quarantine is one of the police powers available to states in responding to 
public health emergencies.58 In Barmore, Mrs. Barmore was confined to her residence by 
the health officials of Chicago as a carrier of Typhoid. Mrs. Barmore was not suffering 
from any symptoms, but several of her borders had become infected with Typhoid. Mrs. 
Barmore pleaded with the court to be released from quarantine. The Barmore court 
denied Mrs. Barmore’s plea stating, “[t]hat the preservation of the public health is one of 
the duties devolving upon the state as a sovereign power will not be questioned. Among 
54 U.S. Const. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
55 42 C.F.R. §70.2 (2002 West). 
56 42 U.S.C.A. §§264, 266 (West). 
57 Annas, George J. “Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties,” New England Journal of Medicine. 
vol. 346:1337, April 25, 2002 num. 17. 
58 Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422 (1922). 
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all the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws none is more important than 
the preservation of public health.”59 The court went on to say that legislatures should be 
granted great deference when regulating the public health, and that as long as the 
interventions are not “arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable,” the courts should not 
review the regulations.60 Clarifying when courts should step in, the Barmore court held 
that a person could not be forcefully quarantined upon mere suspicion, but that if there 
was a reasonable belief that the person could be harming others, that person could be 
quarantined. 
The Barmore court, intentionally or not, based its justification for coerced 
quarantine both in Social Contract theory, and in Utilitarianism. The Court’s reference to 
the duty of the state to provide for the public health is an appeal to the state’s contractual 
duty to protect its citizens. Furthermore, the fact that Mrs. Barmore probably benefited 
from the quarantine of other individuals infected with other diseases in her community 
means that she tacitly approved of the practice of quarantine, and was therefore bound to 
submit to it. The Barmore Court’s limitation of coerced quarantine to those individuals 
who were likely to harm other individuals as a result of being a carrier, is a perfect 
application of Mill’s harm principle. In other words, the autonomy interest of Mrs. 
Barmore could not justly be interfered with unless it was shown that not interfering in her 
autonomy interest would likely lead her to harm other individuals.  
The decision in Barmore unfortunately sheds only a little light on the doomsday 
scenario. Barmore dealt with the quarantining of a person who if not constrained would 
have been the source of harm to others. Jane and her cohort, on the other hand, are not the 
59 Id at 427 
60 Id.
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initiators of harm. It could be argued that Mrs. Barmore, though the source of harm, is no 
different than Jane in that neither Jane nor Mrs. Barmore would have chosen to be in the 
position that they are in. Neither Jane nor Mrs. Barmore intended to cause harm. Despite 
this similarity, the fact that Mrs. Barmore is the genesis of harm is a substantial 
difference. Moreover, Mrs. Barmore was not likely to be injured by her quarantine, 
beyond the injury of confinement, and may even have received some medical benefit. 
Mrs. Barmore could have been cured of her condition, thus, enabling her to leave 
quarantine and to re-enter her normal life, whereas Jane in the doomsday scenario would 
not receive any direct benefit and could be left substantially worse off. What Barmore
does teach is that the courts are likely to refer to Social Contract and Utilitarian 
frameworks when confronting ethical issues in the public health context.  
Another landmark public health case dealt with the issue of mandatory 
vaccinations.61 In Jacobson, Mr. Jacobson refused to submit to a small pox vaccination in 
contravention of a city ordinance requiring all able bodied people to be vaccinated. The 
court upheld the statute, appealing to multiple ethical frameworks including Social 
Contract theory, Utilitarianism, and even Communitarianism. 
As quoted supra the Jacobson Court believed that the “whole people covenants 
with each citizen” for the common good.62 Mr. Jacobson definitely received the benefit of 
living in a community in which most of the citizens had been inoculated against small 
pox. Thus, under a Lockian Social Contract model, he can be said to have tacitly 
consented to mandatory vaccinations.  
61 Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11. 
62 Id. at 27. 
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The appeal to Utilitarianism made by the Jacobson Court once again refers to the 
harm principle. The court held that “real liberty for all could not exist under the operation 
of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, 
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done 
to others.”63 Thus, Mr. Jacobson’s liberty reaches its limit when his actions potentially 
harm others in his community. 
Finally, the Jacobson court appeals to Communitarian principles. The court states 
that “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the 
right to protect itself against an epidemic disease. . ..”64 The Court here isn’t speaking of 
the right of individuals to be protected from disease, but rather is justifying the 
interference with the bodily integrity of an individual for society’s well being. It is odd to 
see an American court appealing to Communitarian principles, but in the context of 
public health, Communitarian principles seem to be almost if not equally as important as 
traditional American liberal ethical principles. 
Like Barmore, there are several key differences between Jacobson and the 
doomsday scenario. Mr. Jacobson was being coerced into receiving a small pox 
vaccination. The vaccine was unlikely to do him any harm.65 In fact, small pox is a 
devastatingly lethal virus, and the vaccine would have likely conferred a strong health 
benefit on Mr. Jacobson. Contrastingly, Jane and her cohort are not being coerced into 
something that is objectively beneficial to them. On the contrary, the hypothetical 
63 Id. at 26 
64 Id. at 27 
65 The small pox vaccine is actually one of the most dangerous vaccines ever used, which factored into its 
demise even before small pox was completely eradicated. However, the actual risk of serious permanent 
harm is still very small on the order of 16 serious permanent injuries per 1 million vaccinations. See
www.http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/11/60II/main532706.shtml (Last viewed 4/27/06.)
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suggests that Jane et al are being potentially coerced into dangerous and painful 
procedures. The second key difference is that Jane et al do not pose a direct risk to 
society whereas Mr. Jacobson by not being vaccinated was creating the risk of 
introducing small pox into his community. Jacobson is more similar to the doomsday 
scenario than Barmore, because in Jacobson, while Mr. Jacobson could be thought of as 
potentially harming the community, an equally valid framing would look at him as 
simply refusing to confer a benefit on the community. This refusal to confer a benefit is 
the same driving force behind the doomsday scenario. While this case gets us closer to 
judicial precedent concerning the doomsday scenario, it is not perfect; it does however 
indicate that Social Contract theory, Utilitarianism, and Communitarianism can all play a 
part in grappling with public health conundrums.  
While the courts have been solicitous of the greater good in most public health 
cases, they are less likely to condone coercion in more personal cases.66 In McFall, Mr. 
McFall was a patient suffering from a likely terminal bone marrow disease. His cousin 
had been determined to be a match, and had his cousin consented to a procedure, Mr. 
McFall’s likelihood of survival would have improved dramatically. Unfortunately, Mr. 
McFall’s cousin refused to consent to the procedure, thereby condemning Mr. McFall to 
an untimely demise. The court, though sympathetic to Mr. McFall, denied his plea for 
relief.  
The underlying rational of the McFall court drew heavily from Kant, declaring that 
individuals have an absolute right to their bodily integrity. The court opined that “[f]or a 
society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein 
or neck of one of its members and suck from its sustenance for another member, is 
66 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90. 
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revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction of living 
body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind.”67
What light does McFall shed on the doomsday scenario? The biggest difference 
between McFall and the doomsday scenario is that in McFall, the court was being asked 
to compel one individual for the sake of another individual. Contrastingly, the doomsday 
scenario asks for a small handful of people to be compelled for the sake of a great many 
people. Additionally, because of the possible devastation of a run-away pandemic, one 
could frame the doomsday scenario as a handful of people being compelled for the sake 
of society, and not for the sake of any particular individuals. Despite this difference, there 
are several key similarities between McFall and doomsday. First, in McFall, the cousin 
was not a cause of the harm, but was uniquely suited to relieve the harm. Similarly in 
doomsday, Jane and her cohort don’t cause the virus, but are uniquely situated to 
meliorate its effects. Second, the cousin in McFall would not have received any benefit 
for assisting McFall. Similarly, Jane et al will not receive any foreseeable benefit for 
participating in the research. 
While McFall and the doomsday scenario are similar, the result in McFall would 
not control in the doomsday scenario for two reasons. The first and probably most 
important reason is the difference in the number of people receiving the potential benefit 
from coercion. A 1:1 ratio is radically different from a 10:1 ratio, and the doomsday 
scenario envisions something much closer to a 1,000,000:1 ratio than to a 1:1 ratio.  
The second reason is that traditional American formulations of Social Contract 
theory, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and even Communitarianism would not have 
provided an ethical basis for Mr. McFall’s request. Social Contract theory falls short 
67 Id.
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because as no compelled live tissue donation had ever occurred or been debated, it is 
impossible to argue that McFall’s cousin had tacitly agreed to it as a term in the social 
contract. McFall’s cousin had never been put on notice that compelled tissue donation 
was part of the social contract in America. Moreover, a Rawlsian would probably not 
argue that someone operating from behind the veil of ignorance would give anyone with 
a donor match to anyone else a claim to that person’s tissues. A person behind the veil 
may at first be tempted to approve of compelled tissue donation, after all, many people 
require some type of tissue donation over the course of their lives. However, a society 
where at anytime someone might lay claim to parts of your body, be it bone marrow, 
eggs, sperm, blood, a retina, a kidney, or anything else, would be a fear society.  
Utilitarians would apply the harm principle to the coercive demands of Mr. McFall, and 
would declare that his attempted coercion of his cousin was an immoral act. To lay claim 
to another person’s tissue is clearly other regarding behavior, and the potential to bring 
harm to that person in claiming the tissue means that compelled tissue donation would 
run afoul of the harm principle. Finally, Communitarians with their concerns being 
focused on the rights of society at large would be unlikely to allow one individual the 
right to another individual’s body. The social harm wrought by widespread compelled 
tissue donation would likely outweigh the benefits achieved in the handful of cases where 
a successful donor is identified yet refuses to donate. Thus, the differences between 
McFall and the doomsday scenario, while not large, are significant enough to lead to 
drastically different ethical conclusions. 
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Having gained an understanding for how courts have dealt with public health issues 
in the past, we will now look at how they would likely address the doomsday scenario 
were it to arise today. 
C. Likely Legal Response to Doomsday 
If the doomsday scenario were to happen today, some Federal agency would likely 
attempt to coerce Jane et al as a means of averting catastrophe. Jane et al would ask a 
court to intervene, and it would almost certainly would. The case would eventually land 
in front of the Supreme Court, but not before much time and life would likely have been 
lost. Lawrence Gostin argues that in this eventuality, the Supreme Court would likely 
analyze the coercion of Jane under a strict scrutiny approach, because the compulsion of 
Jane would likely be considered a violation of a fundamental right to bodily integrity 
under Cruzan v. Director Mo. Dept. of Health.68 Under strict scrutiny, the exercise of 
compulsory powers by the government would not be allowed unless 1. the government 
could show a compelling purpose behind the coercion, 2.the government could show a 
close connection between the means of the coercion and the compelling ends, and 3. that 
the coercion is the least restrictive alternative.69 Under this test, an order coercing Jane 
and her cohort to submit to research would be unlikely to be upheld. 
The first prong of strict scrutiny requiring a compelling state interest in invading 
the bodily integrity of Jane and her cohort would likely be met. In the doomsday 
scenario, all of society is potentially at risk. If enough people were to fall victim to 
68 Gostin, Lawrence O. “Public Health Law in a New Century: Part II Public Health Powers and Limits.” 
Journal American Medical Association vol. 283, no. 22 (June 2000) pg 2982. 
69 Id.
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disease, the economy, the culture, and all social processes would grind to a halt. Not only 
are these overarching impacts part of the government’s interest in compelling Jane et al,
but there is also an interest in simply saving the lives of its citizens. Short of the 
avoidance of nuclear war, it is hard to imagine a more compelling interest than the 
government’s interest in stemming the effects of a devastating pandemic. Thus the Court 
would move on to consider the next prong of strict scrutiny.  
The second prong of strict scrutiny, which requires the means of the 
intervention to be closely related to the ends, may not be met. This means/ends 
requirement is designed to limit irrational and capricious government action. 
Unfortunately, in the doomsday scenario, the likelihood that the invasion of Jane’s bodily 
integrity will result in a generalizable treatment before the pandemic has run its course is 
very small. Furthermore, even if research were likely to lead to a treatment eventually, 
each individual breach of Jane’s bodily integrity would likely be little more than a shot in 
the dark. Consequently, the Supreme Court would be hard pressed to conclude that the 
compelled participation of Jane and her cohort in research would be sufficiently related to 
the goal of stopping a pandemic. 
The third prong of strict scrutiny requiring that the invasion of bodily integrity be 
the least restrictive alternative to accomplish the desired ends would probably not be met 
either. Because the likelihood that research on Jane and her cohort would yield a helpful 
treatment is so small, other less invasive methods for coming up with an effective 
treatment in time may be just as good. These methods might include computer modeling, 
animal research, research on infected people, etc. While these methods are undoubtedly 
unlikely to arrive at a useful result, they may not be less likely to arrive at a useful result 
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than the coercion of Jane. Moreover, the government would first need to try to be 
minimally invasive with Jane and her cohort. They could try to offer her incentives to 
participate, or could begin research in the least invasive ways possible. This attempt to be 
minimally invasive, even if successful at passing the third prong of the strict scrutiny 
analysis would take valuable time away from the response to the pandemic.   
It appears as though the coerced participation of Jane in the doomsday scenario 
would not survive strict scrutiny. Additionally, even if the coercion did survive strict 
scrutiny, the question is close enough that it would consume a great deal of time before 
being answered. This consumption of time is unacceptable in the doomsday scenario. The 
current strict scrutiny approach is not the appropriate method to deal with complex public 
health emergencies. A more streamlined predetermined process must be put into place so 
that valuable time is not lost debating the ethical questions.  
Because the current legal approach to the doomsday scenario is insufficient, the 
next section will look at which of the ethical frameworks might be used to develop an 
alternative legal approach to public health emergencies.  
Part III 
An Alternative Response to Public Health Emergencies. 
This part of the paper will compare situations which are analogous to the 
doomsday scenario and where the government compels individuals with situations that 
are analogous to the doomsday scenario, but where the government does not compel 
individuals. The goal of this comparison is to expose which ethical frameworks 
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predominately determine whether or not government coercion is proper in a given 
situation. Using this framework, an alternative response to public health emergencies can 
be developed.    
A. Analogous situations in which the government compels individuals. 
There are three major characteristics of the doomsday scenario shared by all of the 
following analogies: (1) the individual is compelled to confer a benefit on a group, (2) the 
individual is not directly responsible for the harm (3) the individual will likely be harmed 
in some way by the government coercion, above and beyond the intrinsic harm of being 
coerced. 
The first situation in which the government coerces individuals in a way analogous 
to the doomsday scenario is in the context of compelled testimony. Just as the doomsday 
scenario extracts a potential cure for a societal ill (pandemic) against the will of an 
individual, compelled testimony extracts a potential cure for a societal ill (crime) against 
the will of the individual who is compelled. Additionally, just as the compelled individual 
in the doomsday scenario is not responsible for the harm that they are being forced to 
abate, neither is the compelled individual testifying in court necessarily involved with the 
crime they are testifying about. Finally, just as the compelled participation in research is 
likely to cause some degree of harm to the compelled individual, so too is compelled 
testimony likely to cause harm to an individual. Individuals who are compelled to testify 
are harmed both in that they give up a part of their autonomy, and in that they open 
themselves up to potential reprisals from those whom they testify against. 
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The second analogous example of government coercion is the draft. Conscription 
forces an individual to confer a benefit on society against his or her will, in the form of 
military service. Furthermore, conscription compels people who have not necessarily 
taken part in starting the military conflict that necessitated the use of the draft. Finally, 
conscripted soldiers run a substantial risk of being harmed. In fact, the U.S. uses 
professional troops whenever possible partly because conscripted soldiers are much 
poorer soldiers, and therefore might be at greater risk of harm.70
These two examples are structurally identical to the likely government coercion in 
the doomsday scenario. We shall now look at which ethical frameworks justify 
compelled testimony and the draft. 
1. Social Contract theory can justify both compelled testimony and the draft in two 
ways. First, social contract theorists could argue that tacit consent exists for both the draft 
and for compelled testimony. Both issues have received lengthy debate in the public 
sphere be it protests to the draft, or judicial challenges to compelled testimony. The 
decision to reside in the U.S. knowing that both policies are in effect, and the decision to 
receive the benefit of both policies in the form of national security and public safety, 
equals tacit consent to abide by the policies. Second, a Rawlsian approach could justify 
both policies. A decision made from behind the veil would likely agree to allow both 
forced conscription and compelled testimony. Conscription, as long as it was handled 
justly, could be necessary to protect the lives of all the individuals in the society. Thus, 
the contracting parties would likely see it as a necessary step towards achieving national 
security. Similarly, the contracting parties would likely see compelled testimony as a 
necessary means of enforcing the other agreed upon laws. If witnesses could not be 
70 Henderson, David R. “Draft Talk Premature.” S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 24, 2004 pg E-5. 
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compelled, criminal justice might severely suffer, which would threaten the social 
contract.  
2. Kant’s ethical framework would likely reject both compelled testimony and the 
draft. The categorical imperative that individuals not be used solely as a means to an end 
is violated by both conscription and compelled testimony. The draft potentially takes an 
individual against his or her express wishes and places him or her into military service. It 
does not do this for the individual, but does this solely to reach a particular end: either 
conquest or self-defense. It is the desperate nature of the draft which makes it treat 
individuals solely as a means. As far as compelled testimony is concerned, it uses the 
witness as though the witness were merely a video camera. Through non-leading 
extensive questioning, compelled testimony seeks simply to show to the court the 
physical perceptions of the witness so that the fact finder can come to its own 
determinations. Therefore, Kant would not approve of either the draft or of compelled 
testimony. 
3. John Stuart Mill’s branch of utilitarianism would probably approve of both the 
draft and compelled testimony. Mill’s respect for an individual’s autonomy as the best 
means of maximizing overall human happiness leaves only the harm principle as an 
exception to the ban on government coercion. Mill would probably think of a choice to 
not testify or a choice to not serve in the military as other-regarding behavior. These 
decisions to not act are not like decisions to use an illicit drug in the privacy of one’s own 
home, rather the decision to not assist in a war effort, or the decision to not testify against 
a criminal are decisions which directly impact others. Once the decisions to not 
participate in the draft or to testify is understood as other-regarding behavior, Mill would 
34
apply the harm principle. As a rule Utilitarian, Mill’s harm principle asks whether an 
individual’s behavior if adopted as a general rule would cause harm.71 The answer in the 
contexts of the draft and compelled testimony is almost certainly that harm would be 
caused. If everyone chose to disregard the draft, all individuals would be open to 
whatever ills conquest would bring. Thus the harm principle justifies the draft. Similarly 
if nobody chose to testify in criminal trials, crime would be rampant and the government 
would have little ability to protect citizens against it. Therefore, the harm principle 
justifies compelled testimony. 
4. Communitarians would likely approve of both the draft and compelled 
testimony. Because Communitarians put social rights before individual rights, 
communitarians would ask very different questions than the other ethical theorists. In the 
context of the draft, Communitarians would ask whether society has a right to draft an 
individual if necessary for society’s survival. The answer to this question is almost 
certainly yes. Individuals derive their identity and meaning from their society; 
consequently if society dies, in one sense, so to do the individuals. Therefore, to 
communitarians, the survival of society is more important than the survival of any 
individual members. Under this framework the draft would be approved. In the context of 
compelled testimony Communitarians would ask whether society has a right to compel 
testimony if necessary to enforce the laws. The criminal laws of society are what provide 
the framework which allows people to cooperate and form large social groups with one 
another. If these laws were to weaken because fewer people were willing to testify, 
71 Parmet, Wendy. “Liberalism Communitarianism, and the Public Health: Comments on Lawrence 
Gostin’s Lecture” 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1221 (Dec. 2003) 
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society could potentially break down. Therefore Communitarians would allow for 
compelled testimony. 
B. Analogous situations in which the government does not compel individuals. 
There are at least two situations which are analogous to the doomsday scenario in 
which the government has declined to coerce individuals, compulsory bone marrow 
donation, and an affirmative duty to rescue.  
A system of compulsory bone marrow donation is similar to the doomsday scenario. 
A compulsory donation regime would require all individuals to confer a benefit on 
society by providing society with a potential means to combat leukemia or other bone 
marrow diseases. This is just like the doomsday scenario, which seeks to produce a 
treatment for disease from the biological material of Jane and her cohort.  People 
compelled to donate would not in any way be responsible for the harm that the bone 
marrow donation is supposed to address. Finally, just as in the doomsday scenario, a 
potential harm is done to the bone marrow donors. The donors are harmed by the 
coercion, by an invasion of their privacy, and by the painful bone marrow extraction 
process. 
The positive duty to rescue (Good Samaritan requirement) is another analogous 
situation. While some states have enacted minor Good Samaritan laws, the penalties for 
disregarding them are small, and they only require aid where that aid will not impose a 
risk on the potential Good Samaritan.72 A strong Good Samaritan law would require 
72 Murphy, Liam. “Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue.” 89 Geo. L.J. 605 (Mar. 
2001). 
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individuals to confer a benefit on society by always rendering aid when possible. This 
coercive duty to rescue would not only apply where the Good Samaritan was responsible 
for the harm he is rescuing the other from. Additionally, this coercive duty to rescue 
would potentially harm the Good Samaritan. In almost every rescue situation, there is a 
danger present which might ensnare the Good Samaritan as completely as it has ensnared 
the individual the Good Samaritan was trying to assist.73
These two examples are structurally identical to the doomsday scenario. We will 
now look at which ethical frameworks would justify strong Good Samaritan laws, and a 
mandatory bone marrow registry.  
1. Social Contract theorists would likely approve of both the Good Samaritan laws 
and mandatory bone marrow donation. Just as in the first two analogies, the Social 
Contract theorists would appeal to tacit consent, the covenant between every individual 
and every other individual, and a behind the veil analysis. Compulsory bone marrow 
donation and Good Samaritan laws are perfect examples of tacit consent in a social 
contract. If either policy were to be proposed, they would elicit a great deal of public 
discourse, and if adopted would confer a potential benefit on everyone in the society. 
Therefore, anyone who chose to remain in the society and benefit from a compulsory 
donation regime or Good Samaritan laws could be said to have consented to them. The 
second basis on which a contract theoretician would support either of these policies is 
that if the social contract is between every individual and every other individual for the 
common good, then polices which encourage selfless behavior, such as the good 
73 There are of course rescue scenarios where the risk to the rescuer is almost non-existent. Throwing a 
flotation device to a potential drowning victim for instance places very little risk on the rescuer. However, a 
strong duty to rescue might also apply in situations where the rescuer faces greater risks such as the 
rescuing of someone from a fast moving river. The risk of a rescuer slipping on the bank of a river and 
falling in might be only 1 in 20, but the consequences to the rescuer of falling in could be grave.   
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Samaritan law, and policies which save the lives of valuable individuals, such as 
mandatory marrow donation, can be said to be in the common good. Lastly, a Rawlsian 
approach would also support these two policies. Rational contracting parties behind the 
veil will recognize that they are at least as likely to need a bone marrow transplant or a 
life saving rescue at some point during their lives as they are to have the opportunity to 
donate bone marrow or to make a rescue. Moreover, a bone marrow donation, while 
painful, is not deadly and a rescue, while dangerous, is less likely to lead to injury than 
being in a situation which requires rescue and not having rescue arrive. Thus, any rational 
actor in the original position would have been willing to agree to a compulsory donation 
regime, and strong Good Samaritan laws.  
2. A Kantian ethical framework would likely not permit either mandatory bone 
marrow donation or Good Samaritan laws. Both of these analogous situations would 
violate the categorical imperative that individuals not be used purely as a means to an 
end. Mandatory bone marrow donation would exist purely to transfer life saving 
biological material from one person to another. The coercion of the donor is done purely 
for the prospective donee’s benefit, and the biological material taken from the donor is 
treated as a mere object. Essentially, the donor is just a Petri dish used to grow life-giving 
tissue. Thus, Kant would probably not support government coercion in this instance. 
Similarly, Good Samaritan laws treat the Good Samaritan as an automaton. The ends of 
the law are to benefit society as a whole, and the means is the conveniently placed Good 
Samaritan. While Kant’s golden rule formulation of the categorical imperative would 
condemn as moral monsters individuals who refuse to donate their bone marrow and 
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individuals who refuse to rescue others, this condemnation would not provide an ethical 
basis for government coercion.       
3. John Stuart Mill would likely approve of both mandatory bone marrow donation 
and Good Samaritan laws. Just as in the first two analogies, the decisions to not donate 
bone marrow or not to rescue another individual are not self-regarding behaviors. These 
decisions directly impact the life chances of other individuals. Therefore, Mill would 
apply the harm principle. As a rule Utilitarian, Mill would ask whether a universal refusal 
to donate bone marrow would be harmful to individuals. Because it clearly would be 
harmful to many people in our society who suffer from bone marrow ailments, Mill 
would argue that the government must coerce people to participate in the registry. In the 
context of Good Samaritan laws, Mill would ask whether a universal refusal to render aid 
to individuals in need of help would be harmful. Because a refusal to render aid to those 
in need would result in injury to countless accident victims and other unfortunates, Mill 
would approve of coercive Good Samaritan laws.  
4. Communitarians as primarily concerned with the well being of the social group, 
would likely approve of compulsory bone marrow donation, and of Good Samaritan laws. 
Both of these laws impose relatively minor burdens on individuals when compared to the 
potential benefits they confer on society. Mandatory bone marrow donation has the 
potential to save a great many lives. Every time an individual in a society dies, that 
society loses some value. By implementing a means of protecting the lives of its 
constituent parts, a society is protecting its resources. Because society’s rights supersede 
the rights of its individuals, society can make a claim over the individual’s bone marrow. 
Communitarians would support Good Samaritan laws for the same reason. Good 
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Samaritan laws impede on individual rights, but they save lives.  This benefits the 
society, and because society’s rights supersede individual rights, society can coerce 
rescue. Moreover, Communitarians would argue that Good Samaritan laws encourage a 
strengthening of social bonds by forcing people to help one another. This strengthening 
of social bonds is a benefit to the community, and justifies the imposition on individual 
liberties.  
The next subsection will look at the disparities between the analogies, and will look 
for a pattern to describe how government should respond to the doomsday scenario. 
C. Disparities between the analogies 
All of the analogies were structurally similar to one another, and to the doomsday 
scenario. The government compels an individual to confer a benefit on another to that 
individual’s detriment despite the fact that the individual is not responsible for the initial 
harm. Regardless of this structural similarity, two analogous situations allow for 
government coercion and two do not. Similarly, two of the cases we looked at permitted 
the government to coerce an individual for health reasons, but one did not. Because the 
structural set-up of the scenarios was so similar in all of these cases, it must not be the 
guiding force behind policy. Neither does it appear as though the possible ethical 
frameworks are the guiding force behind policy. 
In all four above analogies, the Kantian framework would not have permitted 
government coercion, therefore it can’t be used to explain why the government is 
permitted to coerce in the contexts of the draft and compelled testimony, but not in the 
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contexts of the Good Samaritan law or mandatory bone marrow donation. Additionally, 
Kant was not appealed to in either compelled quarantine in Barmore or compelled 
inoculation in Jacobson. The only use of the Kantian framework appears to have been in 
McFall and potentially in the contexts of the Good Samaritan law and compulsory bone 
marrow donation. Similarly, Social Contract theory, Utilitarianism, and 
Communitarianism would all have permitted government coercion in the four analogies. 
Consequently, they can’t be used to explain why the government is allowed to coerce in 
some scenarios and not in others. Furthermore, Social Contract theory, Utilitarianism, 
and Communitarianism could all have been used in McFall to justify the compulsory 
bone marrow donation, yet the court refused to apply any of them. While the court in 
McFall did not appeal to these theories, the courts in Barmore and Jacobson appealed to 
all of them to justify government intervention in the public health arena. The seemingly 
inconsistent application of these ethical frameworks makes it difficult to explain why 
government coercion is allowed in some cases, but not in others, and makes it difficult to 
extrapolate a means for dealing with the doomsday scenario. 
Neither the structure of the analogies nor the ethical frameworks employed 
explain why government coercion is acceptable in some scenarios but not in others. The 
factor which appears to be decisive in government response is the exigencies of the 
circumstances. The appeal to practical considerations explains all of the variance between 
the cases, and the analogies. In the situations where the government is not permitted to 
coerce, the consequences of not coercing individuals do not endanger the society, but are 
relatively minor. 
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In McFall, and in the case of compulsory bone marrow donation, the 
consequences of not allowing government compulsion are minor. It seems rare that a 
family member who is a bone marrow match will refuse to donate that material. Thus, the 
number of lives put at risk by the decision in McFall is very small. Additionally, even 
though mandatory bone marrow donation could potentially save many lives, the 
consequences of those deaths for society as a whole are small. Society survived for 
centuries without the ability to transplant bone marrow from one individual to another. 
Because of this simple historical fact, there is little worry that society’s survival is 
threatened by not coercing bone marrow donations.  
Just as in the bone marrow context, Bad Samaritans don’t threaten society itself. 
Most of us want to believe, rightly or wrongly, that people will rescue others whether or 
not a law imposes a duty on them to do so. Because of this belief, the impact of not 
imposing a duty to rescue seems very small. While not imposing a duty to rescue 
probably results in a number of lives lost every year, again this loss does not even come 
close to threatening society’s stability. Where there is little worry that the community will 
be substantially weakened, it appears that the government is not permitted to intervene in 
the autonomy interest of individuals. However, where there is a grave risk, intervention 
will be allowed. 
Compelled quarantine and inoculation were both approved of by the courts in 
Barmore and Jacobson respectively. These two situations presented a substantial risk to 
communities. In the early 20th century, Typhoid and small pox presented substantial 
concerns. Medicine had not progressed to the level of being able to effectively treat 
Typhoid, and small pox even to this day remains a terrifying boogeyman which we fear 
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terrorists may unleash upon us. The courts, in granting the government coercive powers 
to deal with these threats, were concerned about the survival of society if these diseases 
were left completely unchecked. A small pox epidemic would not only kill potentially 
hundreds of thousands of people, but would leave thousands of orphans, could cripple the 
national economy for years, and could threaten the ability of a democracy to operate. 
These potentially community-shattering consequences were what justified government 
interference with individual liberty.  
The consequences of not permitting conscription into the military are similarly 
severe. The draft is a mechanism for the government to shore-up the military in desperate 
circumstances. If the government were not able to compel people to join the military 
where necessary, the government could not protect national security. Society risks 
annihilation at the hands of foreign powers if it is not able to conscript soldiers. It is this 
total risk to the community which justifies the government’s ability to intervene in its 
citizens’ autonomy. 
Compelled testimony is similarly necessary to stave off potentially society-
crippling ills. While many people are willing to testify in criminal trials, if the 
government lacked the ability to compel testimony it is possible that the willingness to 
testify would dissipate. People know that if they don’t voluntarily cooperate with the 
court, they can be held in contempt. Moreover, criminals know that threats to witnesses 
are likely to be ineffective because the government can equally threaten witnesses as well 
as protect them through the witness relocation program. With our society’s deference to 
the defendant, it is possible that many criminal prosecutions would become unsuccessful. 
While we aren’t sure what would happen in this counter-factual scenario, it is reasonable 
43
to believe that crime would increase, and that society’s functioning would be 
substantially impaired. It is this pragmatic fear which justifies the government’s 
intervention in the liberty of its citizens in the case of compelled testimony. 
Where pragmatic concerns are the driving force behind allowing government to 
intervene in the lives of individuals, it appears as though government would be granted 
near carte blanche in the doomsday scenario. As argued earlier, the government’s interest 
in halting a highly lethal, highly contagious pandemic is perhaps second only to its 
interest in avoiding nuclear war. The potential consequence of not forcing Jane and her 
cohort to submit to research is a near total collapse of society. Even though forcing Jane 
and her cohort into research might result in their deaths, where those deaths could save 
the lives of millions, a pragmatic calculation must give the government the power to 
compel Jane.74
Having answered the question of whether or not Jane et al can be compelled in the 
doomsday scenario in the affirmative, all we are left with is the debate over which ethical 
framework to use to justify that decision. 
D. Is a pragmatic approach really an unprincipled approach? 
The seeming discrepancies between the ethical approaches applied in the analogies 
and in the court cases expose the fact that in reality public health law does not fit neatly 
within any single ethical framework. The so called pragmatic framework is really much 
more of a communitarian framework tempered by a deep respect for individual autonomy 
74 Jonas, Hans. “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects” Daedalus, Journal of 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences vol. 98 no. 2 (Spring 1969)  pg 227-229. 
44
and rights.75 The confusing outcomes between the court cases and the analogies is due to 
the fact that while the courts recognize public health law’s connection to communitarian 
principles, the letter of the law itself is much more based in liberal principles. This 
disconnect helps to explain why on the one hand the government can force young men to 
go to war, but on the other hand can’t force people to rescue their fellow citizens even 
when the risk of rescuing is low. The disconnect between communitarian policy and 
liberal law can be seen in the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny approach to coercion in the 
public health context.  
The Supreme Court’s three pronged approach, which looks at whether the 
government has a compelling interest, whether the ends are closely related to the means, 
and whether a less restrictive approach is possible, by not including a balancing element, 
is based in a liberal ethical framework. The first prong of the test does involve some 
consideration of the benefits of the potential government coercion to the community as a 
whole. Unfortunately, because the 3 part test is an element test, no matter how 
compelling the government’s interest is, if either of the second two elements to the test is 
not met then the Court can not allow the government to coerce. This strong deference to 
individual rights does not interfere with effective public health response in the case of 
well known dangers such as small pox. This is because we have data that helps us to 
make an accurate ends/means calculation, and because we know the least intrusive means 
of achieving our public health goals. The problem is that in circumstances such as the 
doomsday scenario the Court’s approach wouldn’t work effectively. As discussed earlier 
75 It is actually hard to say whether the public health laws are communitarian in nature, but consider the 
impact of coercion of individuals on the community’s overall well being, or if the public health laws are a 
combination of liberal and communitarian ideals. In the former circumstance respect for individuals is only 
considered because of its impact on the community, whereas in the latter respect for individuals is 
intrinsically valuable.  
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in the article, government coercion of Jane and her cohort would probably not pass the 
Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny approach. However, Jane and her cohort would probably 
still be coerced into participating in the research because the exigencies of the 
circumstances would require their sacrifice even if the ends/means analysis showed that 
experimenting on Jane and her cohort had a very small likelihood of achieving a 
generalizeable treatment in time. As the old adage goes, “bad facts lead to bad (or 
inconsistent) law.”  The real ethical driver behind public health law, communitarian 
principles tempered by a respect for individual autonomy, would lead the Supreme Court 
to come up with a long and tortured justification for coercing Jane and her group, which 
would be confusing, inconsistent with precedent, and inconsistent with their prior 
formulation of strict scrutiny in the public health context. In order to avoid confusion the 
Court should adopt a new test for government coercion in the public health context, 
which acknowledges the communitarian roots of public health policy while still paying 
deference to the rights of individuals. The next section suggests what a new test might 
look like.      
E. Possible future approaches to the doomsday scenario. 
A new test for determining when and under what circumstance the government 
may coerce one of its citizens into participating in dangerous research for the benefit of 
the public health, must be able to quickly and consistently address the whole range of 
possible public health emergencies. Nancy Kass, a bioethicist at Johns Hopkins School of 
46
Public Health, has suggested a six step analysis for potential coercive public health 
interventions.76
This six step analysis seeks to carefully balance the needs and concerns of the 
public against the rights of the individual. Step one of the analysis is for the goal of the 
planned public health intervention to be determined.77 The second step of the analysis is 
to evaluate the likely effectiveness of the planned intervention in achieving the identified 
goals of the intervention.78 These first two analytical steps are critical in determining the 
kind and degree of benefit that the community can expect from the proposed coercive 
interventions. For instance, a proposed quarantine of HIV positive individuals would not 
be particularly effective at stopping the spread of HIV because it is not a particularly 
contagious virus.79 The third step suggested by Nancy Kass is to assess the burdens 
placed on individuals by the proposed coercive action.80 This step is critical because this 
is where the liberal ethical considerations over individual autonomy and an individual’s 
right to bodily integrity come into play. The fourth step in the analysis is to consider 
whether the burdens placed on individuals can be reduced while still effectively 
achieving the goals of the planned public health intervention.81 Nancy Kass, in asking 
whether the harm to individuals can be reduced while still gaining the public health 
benefit, again recognizes the importance of individual rights while still focusing on the 
rights of the community to be protected from disease. The fifth step is to determine how 
to implement the planned public health intervention in a fair manor and in a way which 
76 Ries, Nola M. “Public Health Law and Ethics: Lessons from SARS and Quarantine.” Health Law Review 
vol. 12 num. 1 pg 4 (2005). 






avoids groundless discrimination.82 The final step in the analysis proposed by Kass is to 
ask whether the benefits of the proposed coercive action outweigh the costs of the 
action.83 This final step in the analysis takes into consideration all of the answers from the 
previous five steps and makes a holistic evaluation as to whether or not the proposed 
coercive public health intervention is the best course of action. This determination is 
based on both the interests of the community (Communitarian framework), and the 
interests of the individuals whose rights are to be impeded (liberal/Kantian framework).  
Would Kass’ analytical framework conclude that coercion of Jane and her cohorts is 
acceptable under the doomsday scenario? 
The goal of coercing Jane and her cohort to participate in research in the doomsday 
scenario is to try to devise some sort of treatment for the illness, or to learn how to 
immunize others against the illness. The likelihood of achieving this goal by pressuring 
Jane and her cohort to participate in research is very small over a short period of time. At 
some point the deadly pandemic would likely burn itself out, thus, the most important 
goal is to devise a treatment quickly. On the other hand, one of the goals of coercive 
research would be to understand the illness better and to eventually devise a treatment. 
This less urgent goal would likely be helped by the coercion of Jane and her cohort. The 
third step in Kass’ analysis would assess the burdens placed on Jane and her group by 
coercive research. The doomsday hypothetical supposes that these burdens are very high 
over and above the standard burdens of confinement and lack of self-determination. Jane 
will be subject to potentially painful and injurious experimentation. The fourth step in the 
analysis asks what can be done to reduce the burdens placed on Jane. Unfortunately, in 
82 Id.
83 Id. at 5 
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the doomsday hypothetical, time is of the essence and so it would be difficult to 
substantially meliorate the burdens of the research. Jane and her group could certainly be 
offered substantial compensation for their forced participation, and all efforts at safety 
and pain reduction could be taken, but it would be difficult to avoid all discomfort. 
Moreover, the substantial burden of confinement against one’s will could not be 
substantially reduced, no matter how nice the accommodations were made for Jane and 
her group. The fifth step in the analysis, which asks that the intervention be as fair as 
possible would determine that the intervention was being fairly targeted to those 
individuals who are most likely to be able to provide some sort of public health benefit by 
being subjected to research. The final part of the analysis would be to weigh all of the 
potential costs of coercing Jane and her cohort into injurious research against all of the 
potential benefits that the research could produce. The costs include not only the 
individual burdens born by Jane and her group, but also include the costs imposed on the 
community in allowing some members of the community to be coerced for the benefit of 
the other members of the community. These costs would then be weighed against the 
benefit that the community could receive from successful research multiplied by 
whatever the probability of success for that research is. While the probability of success 
is low, the great potential benefit of successful research in the doomsday scenario would 
mean that under Kass’ analysis the government should be allowed to coerce Jane and her 
group.    
Kass’ analytical method does a good job of recognizing the important elements, 
which must be considered both from a Communitarian and from a Liberal/Kantian ethical 
framework. Moreover, her analytical method could easily be incorporated into the United 
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States’ public health decision making process. The Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny 
approach in the public health context could be modified to include consideration of all of 
Kass’ steps simply by changing it into a factor analysis and by adding a fourth factor, 
which would weigh the costs of the coercion against the potential benefits. The first 
factor in the modified Supreme Court test would be whether or not the government has a 
compelling interest in coercing the individual. This factor would essentially set a 
threshold. When government interests did not pass the threshold established by this 
factor, the Court’s analysis would be more heavily influenced by a Liberal/Kantian 
ethical framework, which would value individual autonomy over community interests. 
However, if the government’s interest in coercing the individual surpassed the threshold, 
the Court would be more heavily influenced by communitarian considerations. The 
second factor in the modified test would be the ends/means comparison. The ends/means 
comparison basically replaces the first two steps in Kass’ method by asking what the 
goals of the government’s coercion would be, what the probability of achieving those 
goals is, and whether the proposed coercive method is the best method for achieving the 
goals. Additionally, the ends/means question also addresses Kass’ fifth step by making 
sure that the coercive method is sufficiently targeted towards achieving the government’s 
compelling interest. If the means of achieving the government’s interest are 
discriminatory then they are not as highly targeted as they can be, and the Court should 
find that the means are not closely related enough to the ends. Thus, unjustifiably 
discriminatory coercive practices would not survive the modified Supreme Court test. 
The third factor in the modified Supreme Court test would look at whether the proposed 
coercive action is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s purpose. This 
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factor correlates closely with Kass’ fourth step, and ensures that the government will take 
all available steps to reduce the burdens on the individual. The fourth and final factor in 
the modified Supreme Court test is a cost benefit analysis. This factor mirrors Kass’ sixth 
step and also ensures that the Court considers Kass’ third step, which was an assessment 
of the costs likely to be imposed on the coerced individuals. 
This modified test, if implemented by the Supreme Court in a future case or if 
imposed by congress, would be able to respond to public health questions in a consistent 
manner. By still requiring the government to meet the threshold of having a compelling 
interest in the coercive act, the Court grants a strong degree of deference to principles of 
individual autonomy. Moreover, the second and third factors of the Court’s modified test 
protect individuals against capricious or discriminatory actions. Despite all of these 
protections for the rights of individuals, the fourth factor, which requires the Court to 
balance the interests of the community against the rights of the individuals grants the 
Court the ability to protect the public’s health and to ensure that the rights of 
communities against unnecessary dangers can be protected. If Congress or the courts 
were to adopt this modified test, the agencies responsible for public health would 
undoubtedly adapt their regulations to conform with the new test so that the U.S. public 
health system as a whole could consistently respond to difficult ethical public health 
questions.  
The biggest criticism of the proposed modified test is that by introducing a 
balancing test into the court’s analysis the modified approach potentially creates a 
slippery slope problem. Somebody can almost always plausibly argue that society can be 
benefited as a whole by the coercion of a couple of individuals. For instance one could 
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argue that the community benefits if it forces one citizen to donate all of their organs, if 
those organs save the lives of two or more other people. However, this slippery slope 
argument can only be made if someone looks at the modified test in the most superficial 
of ways. The balancing factor in the modified test must consider all of the costs 
associated with a coercive action. These costs include the social and moral costs that 
would inevitably come from a decision to allow society to murder one individual for the 
benefit of several others. Consequently, the modified test suggested herein would be 
unlikely to lead to any results generally considered unconscionable by either a 
Liberal/Kantian or Communitarian ethical framework.         
Part IV 
Conclusion 
The doomsday scenario must permit governmental coercion. While this may be the 
case, it is still critical that the question of whether or not Jane and her cohort can be 
compelled is publicly debated and settled before the doomsday scenario arrives in reality. 
As argued in the introduction, settling the question beforehand avoids several ethical 
problems, and allows the government to respond to an unparalleled emergency with the 
appropriate rapidity.  
It may seem that past public health decisions have been made based purely on 
pragmatic concerns and not based on adherence to a particular ethical framework. This 
perception is created because the courts have not relied on a single ethical framework, but 
have incorporated elements of many different frameworks into their decisions.  
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Ultimately, it does not matter what ethical frameworks would be used in the 
decision making process regarding the doomsday scenario. The main purpose of ethical 
frameworks is to facilitate human interaction and cooperation. As Thomas Hobbes 
argued, ethical norms allow men to rise from the state of nature and to build connections 
with one another. Their purpose is to facilitate human advancement.84 However, when an 
external force such as a lethal pandemic arises which has the potential to force humans 
back into the state of nature, all other ethical imperatives must be pushed aside until the 
external threat is dealt with. When human society and development itself is threatened, 
all ethical rules which impede human society’s defense must perish before the imperative 
that humans survive.85
84 Hobbes, Thomas, Edited by Richard Tuck; Leviathan Cambridge University Press, New York. NY 
(2000). 
85 Jonas, Hans. “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects” Daedalus, Journal of 
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